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In the anarchical structure of international politics, relative treaty effectiveness
has proven to be a difficult task to accomplish concerning environmental issues. Not
only do the authors of these agreements face the challenge of negotiating a functional
structure of rules and regulations amongst diversified interests, but they are also
confronted with the undertakings of implementation and compliance. As each
environmental issue varies in scope and urgency, the number of actors, the kinds of
obligations, the type of monitoring, and their related responses fluctuate according to the
distinct individual situation. Because of this oscillation, evaluating the overall
effectiveness of these environmental treaties proves to be extremely complicated, as no
two treaties are the same. Theory on successful regimes, thus, can only be achieved
through the comparison of different agreements with similar treaty mechanisms.
Through this type of analysis, political scientists hope to develop an increasingly
comprehensive model for treaty effectiveness pertaining to environmental issues.
The International Tropical Timber Agreements of 1983 and 1994 were established
with the hopes of lowering the deforestation rate of tropical timber without encumbering
the market growth of developing member nations. This objective would be achieved
through forest conservation and management efforts that would produce a growing
market of timber from sustainably managed sources. After careful examination of these
two treaties, one can conclude that the 1983 and 1994 Tropical Timber Agreements were
both effective in altering m(,nber state behavior in the pursuance of decreased
deforestation levels and increased sustainability in timber products. While the increased
market transparency promoted in both agreements was successful in reducing member
exports of tropical timber, the Bali Fund, established in the successor agreement,
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encouraged the increased exportation of resources from only sustainably managed
resources by the year 2000 through enhanced financial assistance. Together, the two
International Tropical Timber Agreements gave consuming and producing parties strong
incentive to decrease the rate of tropical timber deforestation.
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS 
The original International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) was signed in 1983
and officially took effect in April of 1985. (Brown Weiss, 1998, 117) A successor
agreement was later signed in 1994, becoming effective in early 1997. (Brown Weiss,
1998, 89) Addressing the concern of significant deforestation in tropical areas, these two
agreements sought to provide a framework for a growing tropical timber market that
derived its product from sustainably managed sources. (1994 Agreement, Article 1[e.1)
Signatory countries were divided into two categories: producing members and consuming
members. The majority of the thirty-two producing members are considered to be
developing countries from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The thirty-two producing
member countries include developing and industrialized nations from North America,
Europe, and the far East. (Brown Weiss, 1998, 119) Together, these two groups
accounted for ninety percent of the world tropical timber trade. (Brown Weiss, 1998,
119)
The term "tropical timber", in the case of these two agreements, refers to any
"non-coniferous wood for industrial uses, which grows or is produced in the countries
situated between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn." (1994 Agreement,
Article 2, #1) This includes logs, plywood, sawnwood, and veneer sheeting. (1994
Agreement, Article 2, #1) "Producing members" qualify as any country "with tropical
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forest resources and/or (is) .a net exporter of tropical timber in volume terms." (1994
Agreement, Article 2, #4) A "consumer member" is any country who becomes a party of
the ITTA and has been approved by the "Council". This term refers to the International
Tropical Timber Council, established in Article 6 of the Agreement. The Council
consists of one representative from each member state and acts as the highest authority of
the International Tropical Timber Organization.
GOALS 
The 1983 and 1994 agreements on tropical timber were established with the
primary aim of instituting sustainable sources of timber in a growing market.
(Agreement, Article 1 [d]). To accomplish this goal, both of the International Tropical
Timber Agreements attempt to: establish international cooperation in the timber market,
advance research and development in forest management, encourage the development of
national policies directed towards conservation and reforestation, and provide means for
greater transparency in the market. (1983 Agreement, Article 1 [a],[c],[d],[h]) These two
agreements diverge, however, in their use of finances and allotted time frames.
The Bali Partnership Fund, established in the 1994 agreement, is a special fund
instituted by consumer countries as a "mechanism for the provision of new and additional
financial resources and expertise needed to enhance the capacity of producing members
to attain the objectives" (1994 Agreement, Article 1 [g]) of the agreement. This
supplementary source of monetary assistance in developing countries proved to be
essential in the respect that "a competitive market for timber generally mean(t) that
renewal of forest resources is not economically feasible." (Sand, 1992, 107)
Compensation for this financial assistance came in the form of a pledge on the part of the
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producing members to achieve the exportation of wood from only sustainably managed
sources by the year 2000. (Agreement, Article 1 [d]) "For the producer countries, (this
addition to the 1983 treaty) was expected to offer opportunities to expand and receive
technical transfers and financial assistance from consuming countries. Consuming
countries, in turn, were to enjoy expanded and stable supplies of tropical timber as well
as increased esteem in the eyes of domestic constituents and international organizations."
(Brown Weiss, 1998, 117). Whether this fund was successful in altering state behavior
from the 1983 treaty is an important question in gauging the effectiveness of the 1994
agreement. This question will be addressed later in this study of treaty effectiveness.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of the 1983 and the 1994
International Tropical Timber Agreements. Effectiveness, in social scientists' terms,
"measures an agreement's impact on behavior." (Goldschmidt, 2002) In order to assess
the effectiveness of these treaties, then, one must determine whether the behavior of
member states conformed with treaty regulations more than it would have otherwise. The
difficulty in this case is that the ITTA's "reporting requirements relate to the international
trade in tropical timber products rather than to forest management." (Jacobson and Brown
Weiss, 1998, 516) Due to the fact that most data concerning member countries will
pertain to the trade of tropical timber, the best way to measure the effectiveness of the
two treaties is through the examination of market behavior in producing states. If the
market of tropical timber exports in member states is seen to behave consistently prior to
and after the treaty's ratification, one could assume that the agreement had no influence
on state behavior and deforestation levels continued to increase. If the market increased
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or decreased, on the other hand, the rate of deforestation can be inferred to change
accordingly. Consuming member data will not be analyzed in this study due to the
inability to discern whether imports of tropical timber are from member countries and
sustainably managed sources.
Data on Producing State Exportation
The data reflected in this study is generated through the isolation of seven
comparable member and non-member producing states. This isolation attempts to
equalize the potential variables that can exist within individual countries. The fourteen
nations I have chosen for the study are representatives of Latin America, Africa, and
Asia, and all are considered to be developing states. Data for the seven member countries
represents Bolivia, Thailand, Equatorial Guinea, Colombia, Ghana, the Cote D'Ivoire,
and Gabon. These countries were selected based on the similar number of votes allocated
to them in Article 41 of the 1994 Agreement. (1994 Agreement, Appendix A) This
equality in vote allocation led me to infer that these countries exported similar amounts of
tropical timber. The data for non-member states represents Vietnam, Nicaragua, Laos,
Suriname, Nigeria, Cambodia, and Guatemala. These countries were selected on the
basis of their proximity to the chosen member states. By selecting neighboring member
and non-member developing states, I hoped to compare geographically similar countries
with analogous economic ci iracteristics.
Examination of Tropical Timber Exports
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In order to determine whether the two tropical timber agreements were effective
in altering member state behavior, one must examine the exportation of these member
states before and after the ratification of the 1983 and the 1994 agreements. This
provides the study with a counterfactual that allows for one to predict what the rates of
exportation in member countries would have been if the treaties had never come into
existence. This counterfactual assumes the continued rate of exportation prior to 1983
and 1997. It is represented by the blue line in Table I.
(Refer to Appendix: Table I)
One can deduce from the blue shaded region in this table (the difference between the
predicted counterfactual and actual trade) that both the 1983 and 1994 agreements
potentially altered state behavior. Witnessed to be a relatively stable "up and down"
cycle of trade in producing member-states, the rate of exportation after the ratification of
the 1983 agreement is seen to decrease at an unnaturally steep rate. Exports are then seen
to remain at consistently low levels for seven years. Only after the 1994 ITTA was
ratified in 1997 did exportation rates prove to gradually increase once again. The
observed changes in export behavior directly coincide with the ratification dates of the
two ITTA treaties, leading one to believe that these two agreements had an effect on
deforestation levels. While the 1983 Tropical Timber Agreement proved effective in
decreasing exports of member states, the 1994 agreement is revealed to have increased
member exports of this unite timber. This finding does not necessarily mean that the
1994 treaty increased deforestation levels, however, as the Bali Partnership Fund
(established in this agreement) instilled mechanisms that would increase sustainable
sources of tropical timber. This will be discussed further in the study.
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When examining the behavior of states prior to and following the ratification of a
treaty, one cannot assume that a witnessed change in behavior can be attributed to the
structure of the International Tropical Timber Agreements of 1983 and 1994. By
comparing the behavior of members to that of non-members, however, one can discount
the theory that the change in exportation rates was an international phenomenon. This
provides the study with a second counterfactual that allows one to predict member-states'
exportation rates through the assumption that member exportation would have been
similar to that of non-members. The purple line in Table I represents this counterfactual.
(Refer to Appendix: Tables I, II)
One can conclude from the green shaded region in this table that the two tropical timber
agreements did, indeed, affect state behavior. Instead of increasing dramatically in the
years following the ratification of the 1983 agreement, the exportation rate of member
countries decreased significantly over the same period of time. Following the ratification
of the 1994 treaty in 1997, the exportation rates of members again contradicted the rates
of non-members, increasing gradually as the non-member exports began to decline. This
comparison of member and non-member countries eliminates the argument that a decline
in tropical timber was encountered internationally. This claim is further supported in
Table III, as the percentage growth of exports in member countries is observed to be
significantly lower and less dynamic than that of non-members.
(Refer to Appendix: Table 17)
Through the comparisons of member exports to the hypothesized counterfactuals
explained above, one could argue that the International Tropical Timber Agreements of
1983 and 1994 were successful in altering member state behavior. From exportation data
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alone, it appears that the 1983 agreement significantly decreased deforestation in member
countries while the 1994 agreement slightly increased member exports. Further research
must be done, however, to determine whether other factors independent of the tropical
timber agreements might be responsible for this change in exportation levels.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Independent Variables Related to the Treaty
The creation of the 1983 and 1994 Tropical Timber Agreements established
distinct mechanisms in the international system of tropical timber trade that potentially
produced the witnessed effects on member exports revealed in Table I.
(Refer to Appendix: Table I)
These mechanisms include the increased transparency in the tropical timber market, the
heightened financial aid provided by the Bali Fund, the establishment of a timeline for
goal achievement, and the indirect initiation of illegal tropical timber exportation through
regulation. Through the analysis of these devices, the argument that the tropical timber
agreements of 1983 and 1994 decreased deforestation in member countries is
corroborated.
Transparency in the Tropical Timber Market
Both the 1983 and 1 D94 International Tropical Timber Agreements encourage the
improvement of "market intelligence with a view to ensuring greater transparency in the
international timber market". (1994 Agreement, Article 1 [h]) Transparency, in the case
of these two agreements, is the "adequacy, accuracy, availability, and accessibility of
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knowledge and information about policies and activities of parties to the treaty." (Chayes,
Chayes, Mitchell, 1998, 43) Authors of the treaties sought to achieve this increased
transparency through the establishment of mandatory data reports, or sunshine methods.
(Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1998, 542) According to the stipulations of the agreement,
all members of the ITTA are required to provide the Council with basic monthly data on
the trade flow of tropical timber. (1994 Agreement, Article 29) The Council would then
analyze the data to decide whether a country's timber industry was operating in a manner
that would promote trade from sustainable sources. This analysis is released to the public
in an annual international report and in the Secretariat newsletter, "enabling governments,
industry, and nongovernmental organizations to monitor progress toward building local
capacity to comply." (Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1998, 549)
The use of sunshine methods by the two ITTAs proved to be successful in
encouraging member countries to comply with treaty objectives through the transparency
of deviations. This transparency has the potential to subject delinquent member countries
to "diffuse negative reactions from (other) states and other groups with a stake in the
treaty regime." (Keohane, 1986, Cited in Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell, 1998, 45) Non-
governmental organizations play a large role in pressuring members to comply by
bringing violations to the attention of the secretariat, fellow member governments, the
media, and in turn, the general public. (Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1998, 545) This role
essentially makes NGOs the "watch dogs" of treaty implementation by exposing,
shaming, and motivating public responses. (Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell, 59) In the
case of the 1983 and 1994 Tropical Timber Agreements, sunshine methods of reporting
act as "indirect sanctions" (Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1998, 549) against violators of
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the agreement. This has been witnessed to increase compliance to treaty regulations, as
"some of the country studies demonstrate that even fear of negative reputational impacts
and diffuse reciprocity (are) adequate" (Keohane, 1986, Cited in Chayes, Chayes, and
Mitchell, 1998, 45) in deterring defiant nations. Transparency in the tropical timber
market, thus, promoted member compliance and decreased the levels of deforestation in
member countries. Non-member countries, on the other hand, would be less likely to
adhere to the regulations established in the two tropical timber treaties, as witnessed in
Table II.
(Refer to Appendix: Table II)
Since they are not required to report data concerning their trading behavior, the actions of
non-member states are less transparent to the international community. Even if high
deforestation rates among non-member nations were internationally transparent, the
adverse affects of sustainable development of these nations' economies would probably
trump their concern for a positive international reputation.
The Bali Partnership Fund
The establishment of the Bali Partnership Fund in the 1994 International Tropical
Timber Agreement is another treaty mechanism that potentially encouraged member
countries to decrease their rates of deforestation. As discussed earlier, this fund
addressed two key problem.- that arose from the implementation of the 1983 agreement:
the need for higher funding in developing producer countries and the need for an
increasingly explicit strategy for achieving sustainable development in the timber
industry.
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1. INCREASED FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
Following the ratification of the original International Tropical Timber Agreement,
member countries decreased their exportation of tropical timber.
(Refer to Appendix: Table I)
They also, however, lost revenue that was essential to most member countries' economy.
(Refer to Appendix: Table IV)
Although the total value of exports for member nations appears to be a consistent "up and
down" trend over the analyzed period of time, the counterfactual generated by
comparison to the economic growth of non-member countries leads one to believe that
the 1983 agreement hindered member countries' export revenue. This economic loss in a
nation dedicated to development provides little incentive for countries to comply to lower
deforestation levels. "For parties to implement and comply with accords, they must feel
that the obligations imposed are equitable... (In the case of the original International
Tropical Timber Agreement), burdens were disproportionately imposed upon producer
countries." (Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1998, 523-524)
To address this problem of inequitably-imposed obligations on the part of the
1983 agreement, authors of the successor agreement in 1994 established the Bali
Partnership Fund. This provided producing member countries with financial incentive to
comply with treaty regulatic Is. The fund was "designed to finance the 'incremental
costs' of compliance, including not only operating projects but also education, training of
national enforcement officials, improvement of scientific facilities, assistance in planning
departments (and) enhancement of data systems." (Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell, 1998,
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53) Overall, this addition to the 1983 agreement gave producing members more
administrative capacity to coincide with their intentions to comply. (Jacobson and Brown
Weiss, 1998, 538.) The success of this fund can be determined in Table I.
(Refer to Appendix: Tables 1)
Prior to the ratification of the successor agreement in 1997, exportation rates of tropical
timber had remained consistently low. This suggests that deforestation rates were lower
as a result of the 1983 agreement, but the economic impact of this deforestation proved to
be harmful in the growth of the timber industry. Non-member nations continued to see a
rapid growth in the value and quantity of tropical timber exports, while member
countries' exports remained stagnant. Following the ratification of the 1994 agreement,
however, the quantity and value of exported timber is seen to increase. This could imply
higher rates of deforestation, but it could also imply that the Bali Partnership Fund was
successful in assisting member nations with the development of sustainably managed
trade. I was unable to acquire sufficient data on forest management practices, but one
could hypothesize that an increase in financial and technical assistance to developing
nations would not increase deforestation rates. This hypothesis would imply that the Bali
Partnership Fund succeeded in encouraging sustainably managed exports, and thus,
decreased the rate of deforestation in member countries.
2. INCREASINGLY EXP: ICIT STRATEGY FOR GOAL ACHIEVEMENT
Prior to the establishment of the Bali Partnership Fund in 1994, the International
Tropical Timber Agreement proved to be difficult in assessing implementation and
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compliance. Article 1 (h) of the 1983 treaty states that the objectives of the agreement is
to
Encourage the development of national policies aimed at
sustainable utilization and conservation of tropical
forests and their genetic resources, and at maintaining the
ecological balance in the regions concerned.
The ambiguity of this objective leaves fulfillment of treaty obligations open to
interpretation, permitting countries to adhere to treaty requirements less than other
countries would have deemed necessary. {Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1998, 524-525)
The Bali Partnership Fund, in response to this problem, established a specific date (the
year 2000) in which all producing member countries were expected to export tropical
timber from sustainably managed sources. Adherence to the treaties is thus hypothesized
to have increased following the ratification of this fund based on the "conventional
wisdom...that the more precise the obligation, the easier it is to assess and promote
compliance." (Chayes and Chayes, 1992, cited in Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1998,
524.) This increased compliance by member states implies the existence of lower
deforestation levels, making the Bali Partnership Fund significant to the ITTAs effect on
state behavior.
Illicit Trade of Tropical Timber
The illegal trade of tropical timber is an indirect treaty mechanism that potentially
altered member state behavior in exportation as witness in Table I.
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(Refer to Appendix: Table 1) 
This graph is a representation of authorized tropical timber exports from 1978 to 2002.
As I have been arguing throughout the study, the decrease in member exports following
the ratification of the 1983 agreement could indicate that deforestation rates were
declining in accordance with treaty regulations. This decrease in exports could also
indicate, however, that the legal trade of tropical timber was decreasing while the illegal 
trade of tropical timber was increasing. The World Bank estimated that governments
worldwide lost approximately ten billion US dollars in revenue to illegal logging in 2002.
(Richards, 2003) "In many forest rich countries, particularly those in the developing
world, illegal logging exceeds legal operations." (Trade and Sustainable Forest
Management Report) Large countries that have agreed to international obligations often
face difficulties in extending the authority of the central government to isolated areas.
Countries with expansive borders experience significant impediments when attempting to
control interstate smuggling, and governments with multiple levels of authority face
complications in coordinating these levels to achieve a common goal. (Jacobson and
Brown Weiss, 1998, 532) Overall, illicit trade is a common occurrence that derives from
trade restrictions on demanded products. (Richards, 2003) While this certainly alters the
exportation data used in this study, one can hypothesize that the extent in which this has
an impact is minimal. The value of tropical timber exported in 2002 was approximately
700 million dollars for the s. •ven isolated countries in this study alone  (the two largest
exporting countries being excluded). Considering that thirty-four producing countries
comprise the ITTO, the loss of ten billion dollars internationally on all types of timber
seems too insignificant to affect the levels of exportation in such a dramatic fashion as
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witnessed in Table I. While the illegal trade of timber is important to consider in the
study of deforestation levels through member exports, it is not a key player in explaining
the change in state behavior that is being analyzed in this paper.
Independent Variables Unrelated to the Treaties (Rival Hypotheses)
In order to prove that the treaty mechanisms explained above were responsible for
altering state behavior, one must discount variables independent of the two treaties that
could have decreased the exportation levels of member countries as seen in Table I. The
three rival hypotheses that I will attempt to disregard are: decreasing forest coverage,
decreasing population, and decreasing demand of tropical timber. The exclusion of these
outside factors as viable causes of decreased exports will be achieved through the
comparison of member states to non-member states.
Decreasing Forest Coverage
A potential rival hypothesis to the argument that the two ITTAs caused member
exports in tropical timber to decrease is the contention that there was a lack of available
timber sources available to the exportation market. If member countries logged more
trees than could be grown in a year, their ability to increase trade would be hindered by
the lower amount of product in the market.
(Refer to Appendix: Table t`;
If you examine the forest coverage in Table V, the rate of deforestation in member
countries is parallel to that of non-member countries. If the depletion in resources was a
variable that decreased exports of tropical timber in member countries, then the same
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decrease in exportation would be expected in non-member countries. Instead, the
exportation rates of member countries decreased while the exportation of non-member
countries increased significantly. One could refute this claim by arguing that member
countries were more likely to be in more advanced stages of resource depletion.
Generally, this assertion would be valid due to the fact that countries who are more
ecologically vulnerable are more likely to be advocates for the creation of an
environmental agreement. In this case, however, the seven isolated member and non-
member states have similar percentages of total deforestation. While forest coverage in
member countries comprised 54.7% of the total land area within a country, forest
coverage in non-member countries comprised 56.9%. From the analysis of forest
coverage in member and non-member states, the idea that resource depletion was
responsible for the decrease in member exports in the evaluated time period can be
discounted.
Decreasing Population
Another rival hypothesis to the theory that the two tropical timber agreements
caused a decrease in member exports is the argument that a decreasing population in
member countries would hinder a nation's ability to produce, and thus, export timber
products. The population of a state can be directly related to the trading industry of that
country through its ability produce. If the population in member countries decreases
over a period of time, it can be expected that the production of exporting countries will be
hindered, assuming that better technology does not replace the ability of man. After
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examining the population trend of member and non-member nations, however, the
population of both groups is witnessed to increase at similar rates.
(Refer to Appendix: Table VI)
This augmentation in population discounts the theory that population diminution caused
the decrease in member exports of tropical timber.
Decrease in demand
The final rival hypothesis that could disregard the argument that the International
Tropical Timber Agreements decreased member exports is the supposition that the
demand for tropical timber decreased in the world market. As technology has advanced
in the past three decades, cheaper alternatives to tropical timber have been presented to
consumers. This would automatically lower the demand for this distinctive wood. The
argument that decreased demand caused such an unnaturally steep decline in member
exports, however, does not sustain itself when non-member exports are analyzed.
(Refer to Appendix. Table II, IV)
As seen in the graph of non-member exportation quantities and capital, countries that
were not parties of the International Tropical Timber Agreements continued to export
products and create revenue in the same time period that the member countries' exports
decreased. Although the demand might not have been as high as it had been in the past,
there was obviously still a 1 .ge market for the exportation of tropical timber. This fact
eliminates the rival theory that a decreased demand for this unique wood was responsible
for the decrease in member nations' exports in the examined time period.
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THE FUTURE OF THE ITTA
The 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement is set to expire in December
of 2006. Negotiations at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) in the beginning of 2006, however, have generated a new treaty to replace
the 1994 agreement. This treaty addresses the problem of an increasing illegal trade that
has emerged as a result of increased regulation established in the 1983 and 1994 ITTAs.
To counter this growing problem, authors of the new agreement have created a voluntary
system of certification. (Agence France, 2006) "Certification" refers to the labeling of
tropical timber products with tags that indicate to consumers that the wood came from
sustainably managed sources. (Agence France, 2006) This new mechanism attempts to
lower the amount of lost revenue that illicit trade inflicts on developing nations. Just as
the 1994 agreement resolved the introduced financial problems of the 1983 agreement,
this new treaty hopes to be the solution to the growing illegal trade of tropical timber.
CONCLUSION
In the anarchical system of international politics, the creation and maintenance of
effective environmental agreements is hard to achieve. After closely analyzing the 1983
and 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreements, one can conclude that these two
treaties are rare examples of successful international cooperation surrounding a broad
environmental quandary. While the increased market transparency promoted in the
ITTAs instigated lower deforestation levels on the part of member countries, the
establishment of the Bali Partnership Fund in the 1994 agreement enhanced the trade of
tropical timber from sustainably managed sources. After performing a more politically-
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based analysis of this study, one can conclude that environmental treaties with strong
financial incentives, explicit treaty objectives, and high behavioral transparency prove to
be more effective in encouraging member countries to comply. While these political
policies do not apply to all environmental predicaments present in today's global
environment, they did prove to be effective measures in promoting compliance of parties
to the 1983 and 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreements.
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